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Abstract. In this paper I focus on the conditions that have to be met for Chisholm’s 
Paradox (CP) to occur. My claim is that identity and structure are notions closely 
related to each other. I propose a discussion in which the minimal framework for CP 
is set, then analyze the paradox in terms of S5, and suggest that in order to capture the 
core of the paradox one should use a dynamic valuation function for the model. 
Identity appears, at this point, to be dependent upon a structuralist point of view. 
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In this paper I analyze the conditions that have to be met for Chisholm’s 
Paradox to hold. My claim is that the manner in which we use the 
notion of identity is closely related to the one of structure. The approach 
consists in historical sections, in which the Quinean critique to 
modal logic and Chisholm’s Paradox (CP) are presented, a section 
in which replies to them are taken into account and finally the 
'deconstruction' of an S5 model in which CP holds. Conclusions 
and further work suggestions are to be found in the end of the paper. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Modal Logic Problems, Quine. Properties and Essences 
 
Quine's critique to modal logic (ML) may have two readings: a 
technical one, and the target is the intensionality it involves, and a 
metaphysical one, where the essences and properties are at stake. 
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The two readings are faces of the same coin, and this is the status 
and implications of de re statements. ML is obtained by adding to 
the standard propositional and or predicate first order logic the 
modal operators necessity and possibility, and the devices they 
entail, in order for the new formed formulas to have a meaning. 
Depending on the scope of the modal operator, the obtained 
statements are either de dicto (that is, the scope is an entire wff) or 
de re (and here, in the scope of the modal operator enters only a part 
of a formula). The difference is between saying, for example, that  
 
(i)  Necessarily, any object is made of matter and 
(ii) Any object is necessarily made of matter. 
 
While the first sentence says that the proposition (in Fregean 
sense) that all the objects are made of matter is necessary, the 
second one attaches necessity to a predicate – being made of 
matter; hence all objects are necessarily made of matter. And this 
tells us somenthing about the objects, and not about the sentence. 
Formalised, the above statements become: 
 
(i.i)  □ (∀x)Mx 
(ii.i)  (∀x) □ Mx, where x is a variable and M the predicate 
"_ is made of matter". 
 
The first case is a de dicto one, while de second a de re. In the 
light shed by Quine's analysis, the second type of sentence is 
problematic since it involves, on the one part, intensional and 
referentially opaque contexts and, on the other one, its evaluation 
commits us to essentialist tendencies. We will focus in this paper 
on the metaphysical part of Quine's critique, and let aside the 
technical one1.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1  For the details of this approach, see (Quine, 1953) 
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1.1. A Weak Analogy between ML and TL 
 
Modal and temporal logic are considered to be similar, and they 
are treated, according to this, in similar manners. But modal logic 
(ML) is not as similar to temporal logic (TL) as we think of, Quine's 
argument goes. In "Worlds Away", the discussion reaches this point. 
Let us consider the monetary content of John's pocket, for example. 
The discussion is directed towards the notion of identity, central 
for the evaluation of the statements about the 'monetary content of 
John's pocket', to which we will refer here on to as an 'object'.  
In TL's terms, another character of our story, Mark, will state 
something about the present state of the respective object. One 
week later he will refer again to the object. And he will also be able 
to add temporal operators as Past and Future, not only Present. In 
evaluating his statements, one will be required to be able to pick 
up the object referred to. And this ability will certainly be 
dependent upon the object's identity and some device that allows 
a decision on the respective identity, whose warrant can be 
temporal continuity. Any point from our time interval can be 
evaluated and the object can be pointed out at, as in the process of 
identification temporal continuity is an accepted criterion. 
Mark also wants to talk about the object in ML's terms. The 
evaluator of his statements' truth-value will use the devices at 
hand, that is, the possible worlds apparatus. He will have to 
evaluate Mark's modal statements at all possible worlds in his 
model, and he will also need to have an identity criterion for the 
object. This should not be a very difficult problem, unless Mark's 
statements are de re, and in this situation, things about the object's 
nature2 would be at stake. Since possible worlds are made up, 
mere stipulations, what reassures him that the objects he evaluates 
across worlds are identical to each other? Any device that warrants 
such a thing would be one that allows him to discriminate between 
essential and non-essential properties and this, in Quine's view, is 
not possible. Evaluating de re statements in ML will drive us into 
                                                 
2  That is, pertaining to its essence. 
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the "jungle of aristotelian essentialism", to which he is a fervent 
opponent, and so these statements are illegitimate. The similar 
treatment of ML and TL is, thus, not justified, because of the 
divergencies occurring between their de re statements. ML without 
them, that would be a recognised logic by Quine. 
 
 
1.2. Chisholm’s Paradox (CP) 
 
The lack of a criterion for cross-world identity has received 
attention from the part of other philosophers as well. Among 
them, Roderick Chisholm, with his famous paradox pointing out 
at the old problem of knowing who. Chisholm's characters are 
Adam and Noah, and the paradox goes as follows: take the two of 
them and exchange their properties starting, for example, with the 
number of years they lived, until you finally reach a world in 
which they switched sides. In all this transformation process 
beware to accommodate all the objects they relate to; thus Adam's 
wife will be, in the second world, the wife of a man (Adam) that 
lived 949 years, instead of 950, and Noah's will be the wife of a 
man living for 931, not 930 years. In the final world, the husband 
of Adam's wife will live for 930 years, and the companion of 
Noah's wife for 950 and so on, for each property. All this process 
seems correct, but we end up with this strange situation: the role 
of Adam from the actual world will be occupied in the final world 
by a man having all the properties and name of Noah, and vice 
versa. Let us sum up: we began from the actual world where our 
characters have their own (and only them have those) properties 
and we operated slight changes in each other such that, for any 
intermediate world, the differences between the same 'assumed' 
object are less relevant than the similarities, so there is no sound 
argument in favor of declaring them distinct. Still, when we take a 
look at the big picture, we notice that those differences we considered 
not relevant, taken together, changed the situation a lot. 
Chisholm notes: 
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"It seems to me that even if Adam does have such essential 
properties, there is no procedure at all for finding out what 
they are. And it also seems to me that there is no way of 
finding out whether he does have any essential properties. Is 
there really a good reason, then, for supposing that he 
does?" (Chisholm, 1967, p. 85) 
 
Later on, this problem is subsumed to that of knowing who – 
namely, that we do not have information to be able to determine which 
are the properties that uniquely characterize an object, person etc. 
In other worlds, we have no strong identity criterion to apply.  
 
 
1.3. Replies 
 
Up to this point, we have two examples, the monetary content of 
one's pocket, and CP, both illustrating a problem specific to de re 
modalities: the unability to warrant for transworld identity. 
Answering to this challenge would mean either to give up the 
concept of identity, or to give an identity criterion strong enough 
to deal with such kind of puzzling situations. Here, we are 
interested with a solution preserving identity. 
 
 
1.3.1. Modal Set Theory 
 
A solution employing the apparatus of modal logic has been 
provided in (Forbes, 1983). Introducing the notion of ‘individual 
essence’ – the set of essential properties3 that uniquely characterize 
an object, Forbes gives a solution for what constitutes the essence 
of a set – it is essential for any set to have the members it has – by 
explicitly formulating these axioms: 
                                                 
3  Also, there are some remarks about what essential properties are not: (a) 
consequences of de dicto truths, (b) necessary universal/general properties 
(self-identity, existence) or their cognates, (c) properties had in virtues of 
necessary truths concerning items of another categories.  
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(Falsehood Principle) 
 
□(∀x)□(∀X)□(x∈X→E(x)&E(X)) 
 
(Membership Rigidity) 
 
□(∀x)□(∀X)□(x∈X→□(E(X)→x∈X)) 
 
(Crossworld Extensionality) 
 
□1(∀X)□2(∀Y)([□(∀z)(A1(z∈X)↔A2(z∈Y))]→X=Y), 
 
where x, y, z are variables for objects, X and Y are names for sets 
and E is the predicate of existence. 
 
(Set Rigidity) 
 
□(∀x)□(Sx→□(E(x)→Sx)) 
 
(Individuality Rigidity) 
 
□(∀x)□(Ix→□(E(x)→Ix)) 
  
Roughly, what they say is that: Falsehood – necessarily, for 
any object and necessarily, for any set, it is necessary that, if an 
object belongs to a set, then this implies the existence of the object 
and of the set). This axiom would put aside the possibility of 
empty sets. 
Membership Rigidity says that it is necessary, for any object 
and for any set, that if an object belongs to a set, then it is 
necessary that the set’s existence implies that the object in question 
belongs to that set. Finally, Crossworld Extensionality brings the 
benefits of indexing properties and worlds, and “specifies an 
indiscernibility condition whose holding across worlds is sufficient 
for transworld identity between the entities for which it holds” 
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(Forbes, 1983, p. 112) it is necessary, for any two sets existing at 
different worlds, that if they have the same members, the 
respective sets are the same. Set Rigidity’s justification is that if 
being a set requires to have been formed at that world and, if sets 
are necessarily sets, then their existence is necessary. The 
Individuality Rigidity simply says that for any object, if it has an 
individual essence, then its existence implies the individual 
essence. There are more axioms to be added to the system, in order 
to be complete, but for our purposes, the above-mentioned one are 
sufficient. Also, with the necessary adjustments, Forbes continues 
the discussion on categories other than sets (artifacts4 and beings5).  
The reader may also find a separate discussion on CP in 
(Forbes, 1984), where two different approaches are examined. Forbes 
takes into account two formulations of the paradox, and then the two 
alternative modal theories that can be used to interpret them.  
Let us suppose we have the predicate "_M_", with the meaning 
"_is constituted of exactly the sum of wood _",  a table h1 the sum 
of wood the table is made of, for any hi, hi+1, sum of wood almost 
coextensive with hi and hn a sum of wood with nothing in common 
with h1. Then, CP would take the form: 
       
◊ Mαh1 vs. ◊ Mαh1 
□( Mαh1 → ◊ Mαh2) ◊ Mαh1→ ◊ Mαh2 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
□(Mαhn-1 → ◊ Mαhn) ◊Mαhn-1→ ◊ Mαhn 
∴ ◊ Mαhn ∴ ◊ Mαhn 
                                                 
4  For a discussion on the importance of the category the object belongs to, 
see (Forbes, 1984). 
5  For beings, Krikpe's necessity of origin thesis is brought into attention (the 
corresponding moment is that of set formation), while concerning the 
artifacts, a logic of vagueness is developed. 
BIANCA SAVU 58 
The second formulation takes the form of Sorites, and Forbes 
argues for considering it as more suitable to express CP. Also, 
concerning the theory one assents to, candidates are counterpart 
theory and a system in which transitivity is rejected6. Forbes 
argues in favor of sustaining the counterpart theory; otherwise, 
best suited to express the logic of broad, or metaphysical necessity 
should be considered an S5-style system. This is what he is 
concerned with when building the modal set theory apparatus. 
Turning back to S5 then, how can you build a model in which the 
paradox arises?  
 
2. S5 Models for CP  
 
2.1. Discussing the Minimal Framework 
 
A model for the minimal system required comprises a set of 
possible worlds W, among which we designate the actual one w* 
and a final world u, a non-empty domain of possible objects D, a 
valuation function V predicates to objects. In our case, the extra- 
and intra-world domain coincide. For the paradox to hold, the 
accessibility relation R has to be at least transitive, so that we have 
warrants that for any three consecutive worlds, if the first can 'see' 
an object in the second, and the second can see the same object in 
the third, then the first one also sees the object from the third. A 
supplementary condition is that the worlds' order is a strict one: 
once the first change has been done then it is necessary to take into 
account what happened at a previous world. If R is symmetric 
then, should it be also reflexive, W can comprise only two 
(possible) worlds, w* and u: if w* sees u and u sees w*, by 
transitivity, w* sees w*. Still, CP would arise in a model with at 
least three possible worlds, and this is mainly because any change 
you operate while transitioning from a world to another one must 
be made accordingly to what happened at the immediate previous 
                                                 
6  See Salmon's proposal and the Forbes discussion in the above mentioned 
(Forbes, 1984). 
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world and considering this then, CP does not hold if the relation is 
from w* to u then to w*, as the initial and final world would 
coincide. Symmetry or reflexivity aren't mandatory- there is no 
need to consider the possible worlds chain backwards and a world 
not seeing itself is no impediment for transitivity principle to hold. 
The minimal modal system in which CP arises, according to the 
observations made above, is the minimal system relying on Axiom 
4 - that is K4. However, we will discuss CP in the S5 framework 
which includes among others K4 as a subsystem. 
 
 
2.2. S5 – The Model 
 
R is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Each world can see itself, 
the worlds seen by a world see, at their turn, the worlds from where 
they are seen, and if any world sees some world seeing another 
one, then the first can see the latter one. Earlier it was mentioned 
that the worlds' appearance is not indifferent hence, form the 
multitude of sets of possible worlds that can be chained, by each 
step and world inclusion we eliminate more possible subsets, until 
we eventually reach the final one. The "selection" process being 
described, let us note some facts about the domains and the 
valuation function. Differences between worlds target properties, 
not objects; in definitive, maintaining the same domain could be a 
necessary condition, if we are to follow Chisholm's indications: 
 
“[...] We then arrive at our description of W2 by accommodating 
our descriptions of the other entities of W1 in such a way 
that these entities will be capable of inhabitating the same 
possible world as the revised Noah and the revised Adam. 
Both Noah and Adam, then, may be found in W2 as well as 
in W1.” (Chisholm, 1967, p. 82) 
  
The valuation function tells us, for each predicate in the model, 
which objects are satisfied by it, and at which possible worlds. 
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What are the conditions we have to impose on this function in 
order to obtain the equilibrium between the properties/predicate 
modifications and the other objects?  
Consider two objects, a and n, and the sets of properties they 
have, {F, G, H}, respectively {K, L, M}. If we are to build a CP-similar 
context, then V must provide a mechanism allowing us to do the 
following moves, from: 
 
[Fa]w* =1, [Fn]w*= 0; ... . 
[Ka]w*= 0, [Kn]w*=1; ... ; to 
[Fa]w1 =0, [Fn]w1=1, [Ga]w1=1, ... ; 
[Ka]w1=1, [Kn]w1=0, ...; 
 
and so on and keeping track on them such that all the relevant 
cognate properties satisfy their objects adequately, maintaining 
thus the internal coherence Chisholm refers to in the paragraph 
cited above. In other words: can we picture a dynamic valuation 
function for our model? 
 If we are to offer an affirmative answer to this question, 
then it may be necessary to divide our work in two parts: one 
focused on the assignments for the actual world, and another one 
derived from the first, that keeps track on the crossworld modifications, 
provided a first property shift/ change has been done. 
The valuation function would link the predicates and objects 
upon the following model: 
 
Shift & Change: for any possible world from the set W, 
except for the actual one, there must exist a previous world 
such that the differences between them consist in the (unique) 
change of the object (understood as one of the objects CP 
applies to) satisfied by some predicate (specification of the 
property modified) and the accommodation of the objects 
entering in relations (and hence of the cognate predicates) 
such that the relations remain the same. 
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We will start by depicting the predicate that changes about 
one object for some other one. Once this has been set, we can start 
populate the new world with objects. The predicates satisfying 
them, if they are cognates of the predicate(s) that were modified, 
would apply to them if and only if the objects mirror the relations 
they initially engaged into. 
 
 
Consequences, Conclusions and Further Work 
 
An observation that can be drawn from the detailed specification 
of this valuation function is that, for the big picture, retainment of 
the world's structure is necessary. By 'structure' we mean, here, n-place 
relations (n >1), and they can be woven in spite of not being able to 
determine any of the objects' essential properties. A direct 
consequence of this is that, should it enter in the 'right' relations, 
any object can occupy any position in the structure. Hence, it is 
plausible that by the end of a chain of possible worlds we 
legitimately infer identities of recognized non-identicals.  
Analyzing a possible S5 model in which CP holds did not 
offer a solution to it; there are well-known replies and answers 
given to this challenge. The relevancy of this approach resides, in 
my opinion, in the emphasis on the conditions that enable CP and 
in the fact that, in the end, it seems that our general notion of 
identity is dependent on a structuralist point of view. 
In a series of articles on the notion of essence, Kit Fine 
argues that the standard account of this notion in terms of 
necessity is misleading (Fine, 1994), and he gives an alternative in 
which essence is a primitive, and necessity is explained by appeal 
to it. A very interesting mark of his approach is that an essentialist 
statement has the following form: A (the statement) is true in 
virtue of the nature of the objects that F, where F is the predicate of 
A, and the class of “objects that F” is formed using the devices of 
abstraction. The result, for the metaphysician, is a web of relations 
and dependencies of objects and properties of objects upon some 
others, and this is how we enter in the realm of grounding theories.  
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CP's above analysis is relevant, in this respect, for more 
reasons; it shows that CP belongs to a family of problems 
pertaining to the notion of structure and problems of modal logic 
have common roots with problems from other disciplines. 
Structural realists, for example, seek for a metaphysical framework 
for their perspective and one of the most famous proposals is ontic 
structural realism (OSR), which asserts that the world has an 
objective modal structure represented by the theoretical part of our 
best scientifical theories (Berenstein & Ladyman, 2012). I consider 
that the Finean grounding theories are a good candidate to fulfill 
the structural realists' demands, and they are also compatible with 
OSR. Recent work in this direction has been made by Shamik 
Dasgupta who, in one of his 2014 articles discusses on plural 
grounds and structural realism. His alleged case is about mass 
quantities, and he proposes a relativist perspective, in which 
plural grounds support a holist-style approach.7 Accommodating 
grounding theories and structural realism is a recent orientation, 
so it is a challenge for anyone considering it to prove its coherence 
and plausibility, so projects questioning the compatibility of these 
interdisciplinary theories would prove to useful. 
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7  I find this a strong point in favor of adopting the Finean accounts on 
essence and grounds. Should we translate Dasgupta's proposal into a 
suggestion for solving CP, it could take the following form: our objects 
cannot be identified or defined by means of separate relations (which is 
what we do when build the paradox by shifting, changing and modifying 
properties), but as the result of the reunion of all the relations they engage 
into. For the long term, we find ourselves in a pragmatist sphere. 
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